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International trade has been cited as a source of widening wage inequality in 
industrial nations. In this paper, I investigate how the structure of the wage premium has 
been impacted within the United States due to rising trade with China. Using the U.S. 
Census data, since China joined WTO, I find the presence of the skill premium and over 
time the skill premium is higher. A counterfactual exercise indicates rising U.S. exports 
to China increase the wages of workers, especially for high-skilled laborers, and the 
effect is more pronounced in 2010. At the same time, increasing imports from China 
increase wages of high-skilled workers in the U.S., but push wages down for low-skilled 
workers. I also find strong evidence that less trade costs dramatically increase 
individual’s wage rates; and the more education he/she has, the more wage growth he/she 
can benefit from decreasing trade costs. Rising trade balances actually promote wages for 
unskilled workers and decrease wages for skilled workers and its impacts on wages are 
falling and become relatively modest in the year 2010. In the end, I conclude that overall 
speaking, rising trade with China and less trade costs widen wage inequality in U.S. 
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While trade liberalization typically increases a country’s real GDP, the 
distributional effects of trade have always been highly debated. These debates have 
intensified since China’s accession into the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the 
expiration of the Multi-Fiber Agreement. The rise of trade, the increase in offshoring, and 
the growth of vertical specialization have no doubt had an impact on the industrial 
structure of the US economy. These factors have also impacted national and local labor 
markets. There have been several studies that have investigated the impact of trade on 
wages; some of these studies also examined the welfare implication in terms of 
calculating the costs and benefits of international trade. Robert C. Feenstra (2003) noted 
in this book, Advanced International Trade, that: 
The idea that countries gain from trade is as old as the idea of comparative advantage itself—
Ricardo wrote his model of trade between England and Portugal to demonstrate both claims. But gains “for 
a country” does not have a well-defined meaning unless we specify what this condition implies for the 
many different individuals located there (p.204). 
From the time of Ricardo, economists have argued that more open markets 
increase the welfare of the average citizen. However, these gains are often not shared 
equally throughout society. Within a country, trade liberalization can benefit some parts 
of the population while other portions of the population lose. One way to measure the 
impact of trade is to investigate how the growth in trade has impacted the wages paid to 
workers with differing skill levels across occupations. In this paper, I am going to discuss 
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how rising trade between the U.S. and China affects wage inequality of the U.S. labor 





The wage premium, which can be defined as the ratio of the wages paid to high-
skilled workers relative to wages paid to low-skilled workers (Marquis, Trehan, and 
Tantivong, 2011), has dramatically changed since 1980 (Autor, Katz, and Kearney, 
2008). The decreasing demand for less-skilled labor and increasing demand for skilled 
labor directly generates a bigger wage gap between these two groups. Several authors 
(Card and DiNardo, 2002, Wheeler, 2005, Steelman and Weinberg, 2005) have argued 
that the growth in the skill premium (wage inequality) can be mostly attributed to skill-
biased technical progress. In many of these studies, globalization is found to have 
contributed to the rising skill premium; but most find that it is of second order 
importance. Sampson (2011) points out that the demand for skilled workers and the 
increase in wage inequality increased in all countries, not only in the aggregate, but also 
“within the upper tail of the skill distribution”; and with endogenous technological 
progress, the rising demand for skill caused by globalization results from “technology 
upgrading by new exporters”. Steelman and Weinberg (2005) concludes that wage 
inequality in United States was large during the first part of the twentieth century, 
decreased during the middle part of the century, and accelerated again toward the end of 
the century (Figure 2.1). Basco and Mestieri (2011) distinguish between (i) trade 
liberalizations in the 1980s, which increased trade in low-skill-intensive goods (denoted 
L-Globalization) and (ii) reductions in communication costs due to the IT revolution, 
which raised trade in middle-skill-intensive goods during the 1990s (denoted C-
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Globalization), and they found wage inequality increases in both globalizations. Some 
studies conducted during the 1990s concluded that the effects of North-South trade on 
inequality were modest (Krugman, 2008). Katz and Murphy (1992) find that trade-
induced changes in relative demand move in same direction that would be consistent with 
a widening wage premium; however, they find the magnitude of the effects could not 
plausibly account for much of the growth. However, it turns out that developing-country 
imports have roughly doubled as a share of the economy since the studies that concluded 
that the effects of trade on income inequality were modest. Krugman (2008) suggestes 
that we should scale up the estimates accordingly. By using employer-employee data of 
German manufacturing, Klein, Moser and Urban (2010) find a significant export wage 
premium for high-skilled workers and an export wage discount for lower skilled workers, 
and the export wage premium to high-skilled workers represents up to one third of their 
overall skill premium. Bivens (2007) claims that the distributional effects of trade are 
now much larger and by 2006, trade flows between the U.S. and its poorer trading 
partners increased relative earnings inequality by just under 7% relative to a no-trade 
baseline. Also, he predicted “over the next 10-20 years, if some prominent forecast of the 
reach service-sector offshoring holds true, and, if current patterns of trade roughly 
characterize this offshoring, then globalization could increase relative wages by 25% over 
this time”. Artuc and Mclaren (2012) find that a worker's industry of employment is 
much more important than either the worker's occupation or skill class in determining 
whether he or she is harmed by a trade shock. 
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U.S. trade deficit with China has increased from $83 billion at 2000 to $295.5 
billion at 2011
1
(Table 2.1), while exports to China have grown, they have not kept pace 
with imports growth. Table 2.2 and Table 2.3
2
 list the top ten U.S. imports from China 
and exports to China. In fact, China’s exports to the U.S. have exceeded Chinese GDP 
growth. What can account for this phenomenon? Krugman (2008) suggests that the U.S. 
imports from China have risen much more rapidly than the growth of the Chinese 
economy, and this “excess growth” reflects reduced barriers to trade, which has led to 
greater international specialization and hence greater trade. According to Krugman’s 
theory, the rapid growth in U.S.-China trade might reflect declines in the cost of 
international communication and shipping and the tariffs into the Chinese markets. In 
Robert Feenstra’s (2007) book, International Trade, he quoted an example: 
Growth in automotive production and sales has been particularly strong since 2000, when China 
joined the World Trade Organization (WTO). With its accession to the WTO, China agreed to reduce its 
tariffs on autos, which were as high as 80% for passenger cars, down to 25% by July 2006. China has 
loosened its import quota as well; those tariffs and quotas, in addition to restrictions at the province and city 
level on what type of cars could be sold, had limited China’s import and put a damper on the auto industry 
in that country. Prices were high and foreign producers were reluctant to sell their newest models. That 
situation has changed dramatically…as foreign firms scramble to compete in China with their latest designs 
and are even planning to export cars from China (p.314). 
How have the U.S. labor markets responded to rising trade with China? How did 
U.S. skill premiums change due to decreasing trade barriers (trade costs)? 
                                                 
1 Source: U.S.-China Business Council; U.S. Department of Commerce; U.S. International Trade Commission (ITC) 
2 Source: U.S.-China Business Council; U.S. Department of Commerce; U.S. International Trade Commission (ITC) 
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CHAPTER THREE 
MODEL AND DATA 
 
The model shows many of the features based on McLaren and Hakobyan’s (2010) 
research on labor market effects of NAFTA. I use a 4.8% sample from the American 
Community Survey (ACS) of U.S. Census Bureau for 2001 and 2011, collected from 
usa.ipums.org, selecting employed workers from age 25 to 64 who report a positive pre-
tax income in the previous calendar year. The sample size is 206,460 workers. Since 
China became a member of WTO at the end of 2001, I assume it was a watershed year in 
the U.S.-China trade history, and thus there was a structural change in wage allocation in 
the U.S. through this decade. Several features in my model need to be highlighted here. 
As is standard in Mincer wage regressions, I include and control for individual 
characteristics, such as age, gender, martial status, whether or not able to speak English, 
race, and educational attainment (high school dropouts, high school graduates, people 
with some college education, college graduates and people with graduate degree). 
Moreover, I “control for a worker’s industry of employment” (McLaren and 
Hakobyan, 2010) and control for working location to allow for industrial and geographic 
divergence. In this paper, I will focus more on how trade between the U.S. and China 
affects industrial wage rates of workers with different educational attainments. I apply the 
North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) 3-digit sector and 27 industries 
are included (Table 3.1, Table 3.2). I apply place of work by state defined as the 
respondent's primary workplace and 50 states and the District of Columbia included in 
my sample. Moreover, I control for the individual’s occupation, classified by the 
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American Community Survey occupational classification system and include 794 
occupations in my sample. 
Third, I calculate trade volumes, trade growth rates and import trade costs, instead 
of tariffs, as trade indicators to measure decreasing trade barriers. The increasing 
openness is not only expressed by decreasing tariffs, but also some trade agreements, 
policy supports, quotas and subsides, etc. Tariffs could be used but most of the decline in 
tariffs occurred before 2001, that is, the substantial decline of tariffs happened not after 
China became a member of WTO but the first decade from 1992-2003 (Figure 3.1).
3
 
China’s reforms and Opening-up Policy raised by President Xiaoping Deng, and China’s 
endeavors to apply for a position in WTO contribute a lot in driving Chinese tariffs down 
dramatically at that time. After that, since 2001, Chinese tariffs have declined gently and 
gradually. Taking into account all the facts above, I suggest trade volume is a better 
indicator than the tariffs here. I apply the NAICS 3-digit industrial U.S.-China import and 
export data from U.S. International Trade Statistics of U.S. Census Bureau, collected 
from censtats.census.gov. It supplies the information of annual U.S. industrial Chinese 
exports and imports (Table 3.3). Trade (import) cost is defined as: 
C. I. F. import value − customs import value 
I also use the import costs share of customs import value as an indicator of measuring 
trade costs share, which is defined as: 
(C. I. F. import value − customs import value)/customs import value 
 
Trade growth rate at year   is defined as: 
                                                 
3 Source: World Development Indicators, World Bank 
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(      −         )/         
 
and I apply each industry’s export (import) data into this formula to get industrial annual 
export (import) growth rates. 
Wage rates and trade volumes are all converted to constant 1999 US dollars. 
Table 3.2 presents the descriptive statistics for the main control variables. The sample is 
29% female and 83% white, 71% married, with an average age of 44 years. 94% of the 
people are able to speak English. High school dropouts are 11% of the total, and high 
school graduates are 41% of the total. People with some college education share 24% of 
the whole population and 17% for the college graduates and 7% for people with graduate 
degree. In this paper, I define unskilled-labor, as the groups of high school dropouts, high 
school graduates and people with some college education, and I define the rest of them as 
skilled labor. Import trade costs share of import value varies from 2% to 27% among 
different industries, with an average of 7%. 
My main regression equation is: 
lo (  )      ∑  
   
 
       ∑  
     
 
         ∑  
          
 
      
                                         
 ∑          ∑                
  
 ∑                  ∑                        
  
    
where    is a set of individual characteristics;        is a dummy variable that equals to 1 
if individual   is employed in industry  ;          is a dummy variable that takes a value 
of 1 if individual  ’s primary workplace is at state  ;        is a dummy variable that 
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equals 1 if individual   is employed as occupation  ;         is a dummy variable that 
equals 1 if individual   is observed in the year 2010;        is a dummy variable that 
takes a value of 1 if individual   is in the educational category  ;          is trade 
indicators that represent U.S.-China annual industrial importing, exporting, trade costs, 
trade balances, trade growth rates of each specific NAICS 3-digit industry. For 
robustness, I measure those trade indicators using several different ways. In particular, by 
using the logarithmic forms and their percentage indexes, as well as different 
combinations of these functional forms applying one or several trade indicators at the 




RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
4.1 Overall Interpretation Regression 
Table 4.1 shows the results for the specification without investigating the impact 
of trade; in this specification I control for individual characteristics, industry and the 
geographic fixed effects; and individuals who have some college education are the 
control group. Column (1) shows the results when I do not include the occupational fixed 
effects, while column two includes the occupational fixed effect. Married white men who 
speak English enjoy higher wages compared to others; the wage rate is a concave in age; 
the workers earn more when they have a higher education level, ceteris paribus. In 2010, 
skill premiums decrease for all workers except people with graduate degree and the wage 
ratio between skilled workers and unskilled workers is increased in the year 2010. In 
column (2), I control for occupational fixed effects; the results are qualitatively similar. 
Wage differences between male and female, married and single, different races, whether 
speaking English or not dramatically change, including wage premium across people who 
have different education levels. People with higher educational attainment have higher 
wages. There is some evidence that this skill premium between unskilled workers (high 
school dropouts and high school graduates) and people with graduate degree widened 
from 2000-2010, but did not widen between unskilled workers and college graduates. 
4.2 Regressions by Logarithmic Trade Indicators 
4.2.1 Trade Volumes 
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Table 4.2 and Table 4.3 shows the main regressions with all right-hand-side 
variables by introducing U.S.-China trade indicators as their logarithmic forms. Table 4.2 
lists the results when I include export and import volumes in the regression, and 
individuals who have some college education are the baseline group. Fixed effect of 
education is relatively more reasonable when only including export volumes in 
regression, that is, people receive more wage premiums when they have a higher 
educational level, and wages across all workers increase in the year 2010. When I include 
import volumes in the regression, the outcome that high school graduates would have 
higher wage premiums than college graduates seems implausible, and people with 
graduate degree receive less wage premiums even than high school dropouts and high 
school graduates when taking into account the occupational fixed effect, which also 
seems implausible. 
In this specification, I investigate the trade effects on people with different 
education levels. On one side, increasing imports from China drags down wages for 
unskilled workers and even more in the year 2010; it promotes wages for skilled workers 
but promotes less in the year 2010 than 2000. On contrary, increasing exports to China 
encourage wages for workers across all education levels, especially for high-skilled 
labors, and even more when it comes to year 2010. When excluding occupational fixed 
effects, in 2000, 1% increase in industrial exports to China would increase wages by 
0.015% for high school dropouts, 0.024% for high school graduates, 0.035% for people 
with some college education, 0.044% for college graduates and 0.057% for people with 
graduate degree. When including occupational fixed effects, in 2000, 1% increase in 
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industrial exports to China would increase wages by 0.011% for high school dropouts, 
0.020% for high school graduates, 0.027% for people with some college education, 
0.036% for college graduates and 0.047% for people with graduate degree. Overall 
speaking, both increasing exports and imports widen wage inequality of U.S. 
4.2.2 Trade balances and trade costs 
Table 4.3 shows the regression by trade costs and trade balances. Trade costs here 
are simply the logarithmic forms of differences between C.I.F. import values and customs 
import values. Industrial trade balances are the logarithmic forms of differences between 
export volumes and import volumes of each industry. 
Regressions by the logarithmic forms of industrial trade balances are imprecisely 
measured. But they indicate that: (1) skill premium exists because individuals with higher 
educational attainment receive higher wages. (2) When I do not consider the occupational 
fixed effects, increasing U.S.-China trade balances encourage wages for unskilled 
laborers, but drive down wages for skilled workers. And in the year 2010, increasing 
trade balances helps middle-skilled workers (high school graduates, people with some 
college education, college graduates) earn more, but high school dropouts and people 
with graduate degree do not benefit from rising trade balances. (3) When I take the 
occupational fixed effects into account, in 2000, trade balances push up wage rates for all 
workers, except those with graduate degrees. And when it comes to year 2010, rising 
trade balances also decrease wages for high school graduates, which I could not explain 
why. Overall speaking, trade balance-induced wage inequality becomes modest in 2010. 
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Regressions by industrial trade costs indicate that (1) college graduates, they seem 
implausibly receive lower wages than high school graduates. And basically, individuals 
gain more wage premiums in the year 2010, apart from high school graduates when I take 
the occupational fixed effects into account. (2) Overall speaking, less trade costs 
encourage higher wage rates for unskilled workers and even more in the year 2010. But 
surprisingly, less trade costs do not promote wages of skilled workers at all, and actually 
decrease skilled workers’ wage rates, which I cannot explain why. Although it becomes 
somewhat better in the year 2010, it still remains a positive relation between trade costs 
and wage rates for skilled workers, which I believe is quite unexpected. Is it really true or 
is there something wrong when I picked up the mathematical forms of independent 
variables? 
4.3 Regressions by Percentage Trade Indicators 
4.3.1 Trade volumes 
Rather than looking at logarithmic forms of trade volumes, this time I convert 
them into their share of GDP, multiplied by 100. This specification is reported in Table 
4.4 and I find better statistical significances and magnitudes of estimated coefficients 
from them. Comparing to Table 4.2, estimators in Table 4.4 on fixed effects of education 
levels are almost all statistically significant and logical that people receive higher wages 
when they have higher educational attainments. When I include the occupational fixed 
effects in the regression, workers across all education levels gain higher wages in the year 
2010 than 2000. Rising imports from China decrease wage rates for unskilled workers 
and increase wages for skilled workers in the year 2000. Taking the occupational fixed 
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effects into account, in 2000, 0.01% increase in industrial imports (from China) share of 
GDP results in wages decrease by 0.61% for high school dropouts, 0.65% for high school 
graduates, 0.36% for people with some college education, and wages increase by 0.20% 
for college graduates and 0.32% for people with graduate degree; in 2010, 0.01% 
increase in industrial imports (from China) share of GDP results in wages decrease by 
0.22% for high school dropouts, 0.16% for high school graduates, 0.07% for people with 
some college education, and wages increase by 0.03% for college graduates and 0.02% 
for people with graduate degree. In 2010, the “import-export” regression shows that 
rising imports from China no longer push down wages for unskilled workers, but the 
“import-only” regression still indicates that imports from China pushes down unskilled 
laborers’ wages. But according to those numbers I listed above, the import’s impacts on 
wages become modest both for skilled and unskilled workers in 2010. And thus, the wage 
gaps between skilled and unskilled laborers, which are resulted from increasing imports 
from China, are smaller in the year 2010.  
Then I take a look at the “export-only” regression. It indicates that rising exports 
to China still dramatically boost wage rates for most of workers, especially skilled 
laborers. For example, when I exclude the occupational fixed effects, in 2000, 0.01% 
increase in industrial exports (to China) share of GDP results in wages increase by 0.54% 
for high school graduates, 2.06% for people with some college education, 3.02% for 
college graduates and 3.91% for people with graduate degree; in 2010, 0.01% increase in 
industrial exports (to China) share of GDP results in wages increase by 0.28% for high 
school dropouts, 0.33% for high school graduates, 1.06% for people with some college 
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education and 1.56% for people with graduate degree. Even when I compare the results 
from regression including occupational fixed effects, they also come out with this same 
conclusion that export’s impacts of promoting wages, especially for high skilled workers, 
are less in 2010. And also, the wage gaps, resulted from industrial exports to China, are 
also smaller in the year 2010, which is consistent with “import-only” regression results. 
4.3.2 Trade balances, trade growth rates and trade costs 
Table 4.5 introduces the impacts from trade balances, trade costs and annual 
industrial trade growth rates. Industrial trade balances are their shares of GDP, multiplied 
by 100. Trade costs applied here are the import costs share of import values as I have 
defined in the previous section; the annual trade growth rate is also defined in the 
previous section. Individuals gain more wage premiums when they have higher 
educational attainments.  
Rising trade balances promote wages for unskilled workers and decrease wages 
for skilled workers; but the impact, both on wages of skilled and unskilled workers, 
becomes modest in the year 2010. For example, taking occupational fixed effects into 
account, in 2000, 0.01% increase in industrial Chinese trade balance share of GDP would 
increase wages by 0.69% for high school graduates, 0.41% for people with some college 
education, and decrease wages by 0.22% for college graduates and 0.34% for people with 
graduate degree; however, in 2010, 0.01% increase in industrial Chinese trade balance 
share of GDP would increase wages by 0.16% for high school graduates, 0.08% for 
people with some college education, and decrease wages by 0.03% for college graduates 
and 0.01% for people with graduate degree. 
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In 2000, industrial export growth rates (exports to China) supported higher wages 
for people with some college education, college graduates and people with graduate 
degrees, but gently decrease wages for unskilled laborers. In 2010, industrial export 
growth rates raise everyone’s wage rates except high school dropouts. The industrial 
import growth rates (imports from China) do not show any statistical significance across 
all groups, but the rates still indicate that rising Chinese import growth will knock down 
wage rates for unskilled laborers in the United States. Overall speaking, both export and 
import growth rates widen wage inequality in U.S. 
Less trade costs push up individual’s wage rates, and the more education he/she 
has, the more wage growth he/she can get from decreasing trade costs. Particularly in the 
year 2000, when excluding the occupational fixed effects, 1% decrease in trade costs 
share of trade values increase wage rates for high school graduates by 1.17%, 1.70% for 
people with some college education, 2.64% for college graduates, and 3.00% for people 
with graduate degrees; and these effects across all laborers increase in the year 2010. If I 
take the occupation into account, in the year 2000, 1% decrease in trade costs share of 
trade values increase wage rates for high school graduates by 0.68%, 0.94% for people 
with some college education, 2.02% for college graduates, and 2.52% for people with 
graduate degrees. Falling U.S.-China trade costs have such noticeable effects on 
increasing wage rates. I conclude it due to the following two reasons: (1) as trade costs 
decline and import prices fall, the U.S. domestic demand for Chinese goods goes up and 
domestic production falls. Parts of producer surplus transfer to consumer surplus and 
there is also extra consumer surplus gaining from lower prices. (2) In the aspect of the 
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U.S. producers, since the Chinese government lowers tariffs, the U.S. products in Chinese 
markets become cheaper and then the Chinese demand for U.S. goods increases. In this 
way, parts of the Chinese government tariff revenue turn into Chinese consumer surplus 
and also U.S. producer surplus. Plus the decreasing trade costs, like transportation costs 
and communication costs, decrease; those expenses turn into producer surplus as well. 
Thus, the aggregate social welfare increases. In conclusion, less trade costs provide wage 
premiums for everyone but also widen the wage inequality in U.S. 
4.4 Occupational Fixed Effects 
When I compare all the results including the occupational fixed effects and 
without the occupational fixed effects in section 4.2 and 4.3, I find out that, (1) including 
occupation as one of the independent variables mostly disperses and lowers the 
influences from trade on wages in my equation; (2) at the same time, it also significantly 
strengthens the part which is the skill premium’s diversifications across different 
occupations and changes over-time itself, not the part induced by trade. 
4.5 Regressions Control for Over-time Fixed Effects 
In case of neglecting fixed effects of industry, location and occupation changing 
in the year 2010, I run a “full-impact” regression: 
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By adding those interactive terms I try to reduce overestimating or 
underestimating trade effects on wage rates. Results are shown at Table 4.6 and Table 
4.7. Some variables are omitted because of perfect collinearity when I bring year    ’s 
cross-terms with industry, occupation and states into model. Comparing Table 4.6 with 
Table 4.2 and Table 4.3, the statistical significances are consistent with previous results, 
and some estimated coefficients, like ln( 𝑥𝑝   ), ln( 𝑚𝑝   ), ln(      𝑏 𝑙    ), 
ln(      𝑏 𝑙    ) ∗         , ln (          ), become even more significant; 
however, the significances of estimated constants are insignificant except the constant in 
the regression by trade balances; the magnitudes of coefficients mostly barely change. 
Imports widen wage gaps between skilled and unskilled workers and the import-induced 
gaps are smaller in 2010; exports provide wage discount for unskilled workers and 
export-induced wage gaps are bigger in 2010; more trade balance reduces wage gap but 
its impact is modest in 2010. The relations between wage inequality and trade volumes 
and trade balances across different education levels are consistent with previous results.  
Comparing Table 4.7 with Table 4.4 and Table 4.5, the statistical significances are 
consistent with previous results, but the significances of estimated constants and 
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estimator          become insignificant. On average, the magnitudes of coefficients 
change little. The relations of trade volumes share, trade balances share, trade costs share 
and trade growth rates across different education levels also do not really change. Imports 
widen wage gaps between skilled and unskilled workers and the import-induced gaps are 
smaller in 2010; exports provide wage discount for unskilled workers and this wage gaps 
are also smaller in 2010; more trade balance reduces wage gaps but its impact is modest 
in 2010; less trade costs no longer provide wage premium for unskilled workers, and 
there is less wage premium for skilled workers comparing with previous results. In 
conclusion, adding cross terms here indeed reduce some impacts from trade on wage 
rates, but overall speaking, it does not change the basic relation between trade and wage 
inequality. Also, it disperses the fixed effects of year 2010 and constants into three 
aspects: industrial, geographical, and occupational. 
 20 
CHAPTER FIVE 
CONCLUSIONS AND IMPERFECTIONS 
 
International trade has been cited as a source of widening wage inequality in 
industrial nations (Klein, Moser and Urban, 2010). In this paper, I investigate how the 
structure of the wage premium has been impacted within the United States due to rising 
trade with China. Using the U.S. Census data, since China joined WTO, I find the 
presence of the skill premium and over time the skill premium is higher. A counterfactual 
exercise indicates rising U.S. exports to China increase the wages of workers, especially 
for high-skilled laborers, and the effect is more pronounced in 2010. At the same time, 
increasing imports from China increase wages of high-skilled workers in the U.S., but 
push wages down for low-skilled workers. I also find strong evidence that less trade costs 
dramatically increase individual’s wage rates; and the more education he/she has, the 
more wage growth he/she can benefit from decreasing trade costs. Rising trade balances 
actually promote wages for unskilled workers and decrease wages for skilled workers and 
its impacts on wages are falling and become relatively modest in the year 2010. A 
summary of all the results can be found in Table 4.8. In the end, I conclude that overall 
speaking, rising trade with China and less trade costs widen wage inequality in U.S. 
There are some imperfections in my study. Some important factors could have 
affected wage rates but I did not take them into account in this paper: (1) the technology 
innovations and progress. Technology progress has irreplaceable and undeniable effects 
on industrial wage growth and wage premium, but I did not include any technology 
indicator in my model. At this extent, it is possible that the trade effects on wages are 
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somewhat biased and could possibly be overestimated. (2) I did not include the impacts 
from immigration in my model. (3) Leamar (1994) argued that “the only legitimate 
approach is to rely on price information, rather than on the trade volume, which is 
endogenous”. But Krugman (2008) suggested that, “in the real world, prices are as 
endogenous as trade volumes, and given the current state of data, it is not likely to 
quantify the actual effect of rising trade on wages until I have a better understanding of 
the increasingly fine-grained nature of international specialization and trade”. Other than 
actually quantifying the trade effects on labor markets, my study may be a reference 





Table 2.1: China's Trade with the United States, 2000-11 ($ billion) 
 2000 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
US exports 19.2 22.1 28.4 34.7 41.8 55.2 65.2 71.5 69.6 91.9 103.9 
  % change* 18.3 14.7 28.9 22.2 20.5 32 18.1 9.5 -2.6 32.1 13.1 
US imports 102.3 125.2 152.4 196.7 243.5 287.8 321.5 337.8 296.4 364.9 399.3 
  % change* 2.2 22.4 21.7 29.1 23.8 18.2 11.7 5.1 -12.3 23.1 9.4 
US balance -83 -103.1 -124 -162 -201.6 -232.5 -256.3 -266.3 -226.8 -273.1 -295.5 
Notes: *Calculated by USCBC. US exports reported on a free-alongside-ship basis; imports on a general customs-value basis. 
Source: US Department of Commerce; US International Trade Commission (ITC).   
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Table 2.2: Top Ten US Exports to China, 2011 ($ billion) 
Commodity Description Volume % Change Over 2010* 
Power generation equipment 10.8 9.70% 
Oil seeds and oleaginous fruits 10.7 -3.10% 
Electrical machinery and equipment 7.2 -16.60% 
Vehicles, excluding rail 6.4 55.60% 
Aircraft and spacecraft 6.3 10.80% 
Optics and medical equipment 5.2 8.30% 
Plastics and articles thereof 5 7.20% 
Pulp and paperboard 3.8 27.10% 
Copper and articles thereof 3.7 32.70% 
Organic chemicals 3.5 17.80% 
Notes: *Calculated by USCBC. US exports reported on a free-alongside-ship basis; 
imports on a general customs-value basis. 
Source: US Department of Commerce; US International Trade Commission (ITC)
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Table 2.3: Top Ten US Imports from China, 2011 ($ billion) 
Commodity description Volume % Change over 2010* 
Electrical machinery and equipment 98.7 8.7 
Power generation equipment 94.9 14.7 
Toys, games, and sports equipment 22.6 -9.4 
Furniture 20.5 2.7 
Footwear and parts thereof 16.7 5.1 
Apparel, knitted or crocheted 15.1 7.4 
Apparel, not knitted or crocheted 15 1.8 
Plastics and articles thereof 10.9 13 
Iron, steel 8.6 18 
Vehicles, excluding rail 8.1 17 
Notes: *Calculated by USCBC. US exports reported on a free-alongside-ship basis; 
imports on a general customs-value basis. 
Source: US Department of Commerce; US International Trade Commission (ITC)
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Table 3.1： NAICS United States Industrial Chinese Trade Volume (2000) 













1,117,440 104,861 114,891 
112 Livestock and 
Livestock Products 
13,332 33,770 36,995 
113 Forestry Products, 
Nesoi 
23,324 49,460 53,012 
114 Fish, Fresh, Chilled, 
or Frozen and Other 
Marine Products 
152,908 513,609 548,743 
211 Oil And Gas 15,447 389,268 417,658 
212 Minerals and Ores 86,002 135,661 181,832 
311 Food and Kindred 
Products 
530,688 498,354 564,451 
312 Beverages and 
Tobacco Products 
4,008 15,310 18,479 
313 Textiles and Fabrics 77,019 395,525 418,354 
314 Textile Mill 
Products 
12,315 1,696,737 1,821,780 
315 Apparel and 
Accessories 
7,621 8,040,426 8,444,984 
316 Leather and Allied 
Products 
87,862 11,033,250 11,750,644 
321 Wood Products 73,989 796,864 934,425 
322 Paper 551,491 598,224 670,551 
323 Printed Matter and 
Related Products, 
Nesoi 
59,527 654,522 709,223 
324 Petroleum and Coal 
Products 
45,172 205,000 224,311 
325 Chemicals  2,230,528 1,545,568 1,670,835 
326 Plastics and Rubber 
Products 
166,128 2,438,960 2,728,654 
327 Nonmetallic Mineral 
Products 
167,254 2,269,883 2,620,772 
331 Primary Metal 
Manufacturing 
370,695 1,087,533 1,208,031 
332 Fabricated Metal 
Products, Nesoi 
279,667 3,384,402 3,707,626 
333 Machinery, Except 
Electrical 
1,946,890 4,445,868 4,681,496 
334 Computer and 
Electronic Products 









1,957,184 2,139,651 2,337,549 
337 Furniture and 
Fixtures 




150,056 16,378,666 17,818,223 
Note: *In Thousands of Dollars, converted to constant 1999 U.S. dollars 
Source: U.S. International Trade Statistics, United States Census Bureau 
 
 26 
Table 3.2： NAICS United States Industrial Chinese Trade Volume (2010) 













10,522,627 357,310 376,709 
112 Livestock and 
Livestock Products 
159,526 28,383 29,857 
113 Forestry Products, 
Nesoi 
512,856 92,661 96,390 
114 Fish, Fresh, 
Chilled, or Frozen 
and Other Marine 
Products 
596,234 1,524,969 1,610,536 
211 Oil And Gas 18,635 97,259 101,834 
212 Minerals and Ores 1,571,726 143,400 179,438 
311 Food and Kindred 
Products 
2,171,619 2,180,379 2,389,762 
312 Beverages and 
Tobacco Products 
426,638 27,765 30,769 
313 Textiles and 
Fabrics 
311,988 1,057,229 1,135,441 
314 Textile Mill 
Products 
40,108 6,288,499 6,770,445 
315 Apparel and 
Accessories 
22,318 23,658,844 24,799,327 
316 Leather and Allied 
Products 
226,868 17,061,209 18,011,457 
321 Wood Products 401,790 2,052,332 2,288,530 
322 Paper 1,612,805 2,090,196 2,316,548 
323 Printed Matter and 
Related Products, 
Nesoi 
125,368 1,740,283 1,857,957 
324 Petroleum and Coal 
Products 
496,666 208,909 215,674 
325 Chemicals  9,022,485 9,552,192 10,042,362 
326 Plastics and Rubber 
Products 
781,466 7,993,370 8,751,053 
327 Nonmetallic 
Mineral Products 
440,660 3,932,630 4,481,917 
331 Primary Metal 
Manufacturing 
2,364,478 2,728,500 2,893,213 
332 Fabricated Metal 
Products, Nesoi 
1,190,535 10,804,839 11,561,737 
333 Machinery, Except 
Electrical 
7,106,788 12,981,603 13,677,053 
334 Computer and 
Electronic Products 
11,652,175 101,436,352 103,504,086 







8,110,613 6,776,847 7,246,338 
337 Furniture and 
Fixtures 




1,162,195 28,654,087 30,159,902 
Note: *In Thousands of Dollars, converted to constant 1999 U.S. dollars 
Source: U.S. International Trade Statistics, United States Census Bureau 
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Table 3.3：Summary Statistics 
Variable Mean St.Dev. Min Max 
Age 44.77  10.24  25.00  64.00  
Female 0.29  0.45  0.00  1.00  
Married 0.71  0.45  0.00  1.00  
Asian 0.05  0.22  0.00  1.00  
Black or African American 0.07  0.26  0.00  1.00  
White 0.83  0.37  0.00  1.00  
English speaking 0.94  0.24  0.00  1.00  
High school dropouts 0.11  0.31  0.00  1.00  
High school graduates 0.41  0.49  0.00  1.00  
Some college 0.24  0.43  0.00  1.00  
College graduates 0.17  0.37  0.00  1.00  
Graduate degree 0.07  0.26  0.00  1.00  
ln(Annual export to China by 
industry) 
14.11  1.76  8.41  16.20  
ln(Annual import to China by 
industry) 
15.15  1.85  10.10  18.50  
Share of trade cost of import by 
industry 
0.07  0.03  0.02  0.27  
Export share of GDP (China) by 
industry *100 
0.03  0.04  0.00  0.10  
Import share of GDP (China) by 
industry *100 
0.12  0.21  0.00  0.97  
Annual export growth rate by 
industry 
0.20 0.32 -0.47 3.29 
Annual import growth rate by 
industry 
0.10 0.15 -0.70 1.19 
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Table 4.1：Regression Results: Individual Characteristics 
 Without occupation With occupation 
Age  0.0656*** 0.0571*** 
  (0.00129) (0.00123) 
Age^2  -0.000643*** -0.000560*** 
  (0.0000146) (0.0000139) 
Female  -0.336*** -0.291*** 
  (0.00354) (0.00382) 
Married  0.145*** 0.105*** 
  (0.00348) (0.0033) 
Asian  0.00635 0.0165 
  (0.00965) (0.00919) 
Black or African American  -0.0600*** -0.0220* 
  (0.00943) (0.00907) 
White  0.136*** 0.0886*** 
  (0.00746) (0.00716) 
English speaking  0.319*** 0.211*** 
  (0.00787) (0.00773) 
High school dropouts  -0.383*** -0.247*** 
  (0.00933) (0.0096) 
High school graduates  -0.183*** -0.0902*** 
  (0.00578) (0.00577) 
College graduates  0.372*** 0.188*** 
  (0.00769) (0.00797) 
Graduate degree  0.603*** 0.346*** 
  (0.0111) (0.0118) 
High school dropouts*(year=2010)  0.00974 0.0377** 
  (0.0117) (0.0122) 
High school graduates*(year=2010)  -0.00394 0.0133 
  (0.00751) (0.0075) 
College graduates*(year=2010)  0.0532*** 0.0226* 
  (0.00977) (0.0102) 
Graduate degree*(year=2010)  0.130*** 0.0622*** 
  (0.0135) (0.0146) 
Year=2010  -0.105*** 0.252*** 
  (0.00592) (0.0163) 
Constant  7.952*** 7.474*** 
  (0.0687) (0.0802) 
Observations  206460 206460 
R-squared  0.35 0.423 
Standard errors are in parentheses. 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
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Table 4.2: Regression Results: Logarithmic Trade Volumes 
 lnEX lnIM lnIM lnEX 












High school dropouts  0.115 0.121 -0.0481 -0.00439 -0.129 -0.0528 
  (-0.101) (-0.103) (0.0895) (0.0914) (0.0708) (0.0703) 
High school graduates  0.126 0.0946 0.0845 0.0618 -0.0429 -0.000275 
  (0.0677) (0.066) (0.0642) (0.0624) (0.0471) (0.0452) 
College graduates  -0.0283 -0.191* -0.0685 -0.217** 0.245*** 0.065 
  (0.0851) (0.0784) (0.0814) (0.0754) (0.0639) (0.0583) 
Graduate degree  0.119 -0.137 0.168 -0.0975 0.294** 0.0637 
  (0.133) (0.123) (0.123) (0.116) (0.111) (0.1) 
High school dropouts  0.381** 0.342** 0.301** 0.209 0.116 0.202* 
  *(year=2010)  (0.129) (0.131) (0.107) (0.111) (0.0958) (0.0951) 
High school graduates 0.0761 0.064 0.0364 -0.00354 0.0815 0.105 
  *(year=2010)   (0.0886) (0.0865) (0.0795) (0.0778) (0.0689) (0.066) 
College graduates  0.00834 0.139 0.0943 0.17 -0.0947 0.0079 
   *(year=2010) (0.111) (0.103) (0.0994) (0.0932) (0.0919) (0.0852) 
Graduate degree  0.103 0.107 0.176 0.133 0.0232 0.0312 
  *(year=2010) (0.17) (0.158) (0.146) (0.139) (0.15) (0.137) 
Year=2010  -0.293*** 0.0332 -0.0531 0.264*** -0.304*** 0.0705 
  (0.076) (0.0775) (0.0614) (0.0614) (0.0581) (0.0593) 
ln(export)  0.0156* 0.0261***   0.0348*** 0.0267*** 
  (0.0075) (0.00753)   (0.00553) (0.00569) 
ln(import)  -0.0280** -0.0125 0.00162 -0.00214   
  (0.0102) (0.0103) (0.00804) (0.00795)   
ln(export)*year2010  0.0157** 0.0106*   0.0101* 0.00933* 
  (0.00485) (0.00472)   (0.00395) (0.00386) 
ln(import)*year2010  -0.00197 0.00185 -0.00336 -0.0011   
  (0.0048) (0.00465) (0.00411) (0.004)   
High school  -0.0218*** -0.0142* -0.0235*** -0.0172**   
  dropouts*import (0.00647) (0.00656) (0.00617) (0.00628)   
High school  -0.0166*** -0.00865 -0.0186*** -0.0107*   
 graduates*import (0.00481) (0.00462) (0.00437) (0.00424)   
College degree*import  0.0346*** 0.0307*** 0.0300*** 0.0278***   
  (0.00635) (0.00588) (0.00545) (0.00504)   
Graduate degree*import  0.0237* 0.0249** 0.0291*** 0.0300***   
  (0.0098) (0.00938) (0.00811) (0.00764)   
High school dropouts* -0.0164* -0.00947 -0.0184* -0.0105   
  import*(year=2010)  (0.00762) (0.00782) (0.00725) (0.00749)   
High school graduates*  -0.000405 0.00327 -0.00143 0.0018   
  import*(year=2010)   (0.00584) (0.00565) (0.00528) (0.00515)   
College degree*  -0.0113 -0.0143* -0.00468 -0.0112   
  import*(year=2010) (0.00757) (0.00708) (0.00651) (0.00609)   
Graduate degree*  -0.00535 -0.00454 -0.00513 -0.00664   
  import*(year=2010) (0.0113) (0.0109) (0.00941) (0.00894)   
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Table 4.2: Regression Results: Logarithmic Trade Volumes (continued) 
High school  -0.0152** -0.0134*   -0.0202*** -0.0155** 
 dropouts*export (0.00576) (0.00569)   (0.0055) (0.00545) 
High school  -0.00556 -0.00481   -0.0109** -0.00701* 
 graduates*export (0.0039) (0.00371)   (0.00354) (0.0034) 
College degree*export  -0.008 -0.00513   0.00946* 0.00932* 
  (0.00539) (0.00496)   (0.00465) (0.00425) 
Graduate degree*export  0.00939 0.00829   0.0222** 0.0205** 
  (0.00947) (0.00872)   (0.00783) (0.00707) 
High school dropouts*  -0.00561 -0.00878   -0.00493 -0.00951 
  export*(year=2010) (0.00739) (0.00732)   (0.00706) (0.00701) 
High school graduates*  -0.00321 -0.00577   -0.00467 -0.00548 
  export*(year=2010) (0.00545) (0.00518)   (0.00491) (0.0047) 
College degree*  0.0131 0.00567   0.009 0.0000422 
  export*(year=2010) (0.00743) (0.00692)   (0.0064) (0.00594) 
Graduate degree*  0.00437 -0.000967   0.00489 0.000129 
  export*(year=2010) (0.0123) (0.0113)   (0.0102) (0.00936) 
Constant  8.839*** 7.960*** 8.182*** 7.704*** 7.544*** 7.172*** 
  (0.159) (0.162) (0.141) (0.142) (0.0963) (0.107) 
R-squared  0.353 0.424 0.352 0.424 0.351 0.423 
Standard errors are in parentheses. 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
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Table 4.3: Regression Results: Logarithmic Trade Balances and Trade Costs 
  ln(TradeBalance) ln(TradeCost) 








High school dropouts  -0.543** -0.609** -0.101 -0.0343 
  (0.188) (0.189) (0.0824) (0.0842) 
High school graduates  -0.18 -0.189 0.0188 0.0224 
  (0.136) (0.134) (0.062) (0.0603) 
College graduates  0.757*** 0.347* -0.0356 -0.157* 
  (0.172) (0.176) (0.081) (0.0748) 
Graduate degree  1.084*** 0.614** 0.206 -0.012 
  (0.208) (0.214) (0.128) (0.121) 
High school dropouts  0.362 0.609** 0.213* 0.144 
 *(year=2010) (0.193) (0.194) (0.0972) (0.101) 
High school graduates  0.147 0.234 0.0287 -0.011 
 *(year=2010) (0.142) (0.14) (0.0755) (0.0739) 
College graduates*(year=2010)  -0.244 -0.0735 0.134 0.188* 
  (0.181) (0.184) (0.0968) (0.0906) 
Graduate degree*(year=2010)  -0.128 -0.115 0.156 0.101 
  (0.229) (0.232) (0.149) (0.141) 
Year=2010  -0.0919 0.433** -0.0477 0.275*** 
 (0.119) (0.132) (0.0592) (0.0593) 
ln(trade balance)  0.0115 0.0187   
  (0.00965) (0.0111)   
ln(trade balance)*year2010 -0.000999 -0.0116   
  (0.00903) (0.00975)   
ln(trade balance)* 0.0094 0.0248   
 high school dropouts (0.0146) (0.0147)   
ln(trade balance)* -0.000298 0.00633   
 high school graduates (0.0104) (0.0102)   
ln(trade balance)* -0.0304* -0.0115   
 college graduates (0.0131) (0.0134)   
ln(trade balance)*  -0.0370* -0.0195   
 graduate degree (0.0158) (0.0163)   
ln(trade balance)*high school  -0.0206 -0.0396**   
  dropouts*year2010 (0.015) (0.0151)   
ln(trade balance)*high school  -0.0109 -0.0164   
  graduates*year2010 (0.0108) (0.0107)   
ln(trade balance)*college  0.0222 0.00546   
  graduates*year2010 (0.0138) (0.0141)   
ln(trade balance)*graduate   0.0174 0.00884   
  degree*year2010 (0.0173) (0.0175)   
lnCOST    -0.0142 -0.0125 
    (0.00763) (0.00753) 
lnCOST*year2010   -0.00346 -0.00171 
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Table 4.3: Regression Results: Logarithmic Trade Balances and Trade Costs 
(continued) 
    (0.00478) (0.00468) 
lnCOST*high school dropouts   -0.0238*** -0.0182** 
    (0.00683) (0.00696) 
lnCOST*high school graduates   -0.0170*** -0.00955 
    (0.00509) (0.00494) 
lnCOST*college graduates   0.0337*** 0.0287*** 
    (0.00658) (0.00607) 
lnCOST*graduate degree   0.0323** 0.0295** 
    (0.0103) (0.00967) 
lnCOST*high school dropouts   -0.0161* -0.00801 
   *year2010   (0.00796) (0.00821) 
lnCOST*high school graduates   -0.00173 0.00244 
   *year2010   (0.00608) (0.00594) 
lnCOST*college graduates   -0.0082 -0.0144* 
 *year2010   (0.00772) (0.00722) 
lnCOST*graduate degree   -0.00411 -0.00481 
 *year2010   (0.0117) (0.0111) 
Constant  8.752*** 7.868*** 8.387*** 7.828*** 
  (0.151) (0.185) (0.117) (0.119) 
R-squared  0.364 0.429 0.352 0.423 
Standard errors are in parentheses. 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
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Table 4.4: Regression Results: Trade Volumes Share 
 export% import% import% export% 












High school dropouts  -0.348*** -0.229*** -0.363*** -0.237*** -0.361*** -0.236 
  (0.0123) (0.0124) (0.0115) (0.0117) (0.0117) (0.0118) 





  (0.00803) (0.0078) (0.00725) (0.00713) (0.00785) (0.00761) 
College graduates  0.346*** 0.156*** 0.340*** 0.151*** 0.354*** 0.165*** 
  (0.0114) (0.0111) (0.00992) (0.0099) (0.0114) (0.0111) 
Graduate degree  0.555*** 0.286*** 0.559*** 0.293*** 0.558*** 0.292*** 
  (0.019) (0.0183) (0.0149) (0.0152) (0.019) (0.0182) 
High school dropouts  0.0182 0.0591*** 0.0164 0.0424** 0.0149 0.0575*** 
  *(year=2010) (0.0161) (0.0162) (0.0141) (0.0145) (0.0155) (0.0156) 
High school graduates  0.00289 0.0242* -0.00756 0.0114 0.00579 0.0273** 
  *(year=2010) (0.011) (0.0106) (0.00921) (0.00908) (0.0108) (0.0105) 
College graduates  0.0424** 0.0294* 0.0628*** 0.0399** 0.0399** 0.0242 
 *(year=2010) (0.0154) (0.0148) (0.0123) (0.0124) (0.0153) (0.0148) 
Graduate degree  0.142*** 0.0850*** 0.160*** 0.0936*** 0.142*** 0.0836*** 
 *(year=2010) (0.025) (0.0239) (0.0179) (0.0185) (0.0249) (0.0239) 
Year=2010  -0.132*** 0.220*** -0.111*** 0.247*** -0.121*** 0.239*** 
  (0.00948) (0.0181) (0.0073) (0.0168) (0.00895) (0.0176) 
import*100/GDP  0.147 -0.0715 -0.0707 -0.358**   
  (0.16) (0.156) (0.129) (0.123)   
(import*100/GDP) 0.118 0.228* 0.0865 0.287**   
 *year2010 (0.118) (0.114) (0.104) (0.0986)   
export*100/GDP  7.638*** 6.235***   2.060*** 1.416** 
  (1.12) (1.194)   (0.488) (0.485) 
(export*100/GDP)*  -5.264*** -4.280***   -0.999** -0.671 
 year2010 (0.835) (0.879)   (0.359) (0.349) 
High school dropouts*  -1.881* -1.21   -2.372*** -1.279* 
  export share of GDP (0.772) (0.753)   (0.664) (0.646) 
High school graduates*  -0.903* -0.48   -1.520*** -0.772* 
  export share of GDP (0.44) (0.418)   (0.366) (0.345) 
College degree*  -0.554 -0.355   0.962* 1.377*** 
  export share of GDP (0.573) (0.533)   (0.423) (0.388) 
Graduate degree*  0.54 0.765   1.854** 2.460*** 
  export share of GDP (0.867) (0.794)   (0.611) (0.567) 
High school 
dropouts*export  
1.222 0.378   1.595* 0.414 
  share of 
GDP*(year=2010) 
(0.796) (0.779)   (0.692) (0.674) 
High school 
graduates*export  
0.384 -0.0226   0.792* 0.182 
   share of 
GDP*(year=2010) 
(0.463) (0.44)   (0.389) (0.368) 
College degree*export  
share of GDP 
0.845 0.478   -0.356 -0.937* 
    *(year=2010) (0.6) (0.559)   (0.452) (0.417) 
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Table 4.4: Regression Results: Trade Volumes Share (continued) 
Graduates degree*export 
share of GDP  
-0.184 -0.488   -1.356* -1.895** 
   *(year=2010) (0.9) (0.826)   (0.651) (0.603) 
High school dropouts*  -0.357* -0.139 -0.513*** -0.256   
   import share of GDP (0.173) (0.168) (0.149) (0.144)   
High school graduates*  -0.387*** -0.226* -0.500*** -0.289***   
   import share of GDP (0.101) (0.0959) (0.0843) (0.0792)   
College degree*  0.524*** 0.595*** 0.463*** 0.554***   
   import share of GDP (0.122) (0.114) (0.09) (0.0834)   
Graduate degree*  0.434** 0.550*** 0.540*** 0.676***   
   import share of GDP (0.167) (0.157) (0.118) (0.112)   
High school 
dropouts*import  
0.129 0.0261 0.248 0.104   
   share of 
GDP*(year=2010) 
(0.176) (0.172) (0.152) (0.149)   
High school 
graduates*import  
0.270** 0.166 0.354*** 0.201*   
   share of 
GDP*(year=2010) 
(0.104) (0.0982) (0.0867) (0.0815)   
College degree*import  
share of GDP 
-0.438*** -0.498*** -0.364*** -0.453***   
   *(year=2010) (0.124) (0.116) (0.0923) (0.0856)   
Graduates degree*import 
share of GDP  
-0.408* -0.471** -0.504*** -0.589***   
   *(year=2010) (0.169) (0.159) (0.12) (0.114)   
Constant  7.957*** 7.524*** 7.963*** 7.505*** 7.960*** 7.510*** 
  (0.0687) (0.0805) (0.0686) (0.0802) (0.0687) (0.0805) 
R-squared  0.352 0.424 0.351 0.423 0.351 0.423 
Standard errors are in parentheses. 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001  
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Table 4.5: Regression Results: Trade Balance Share,  
Trade Costs Share and Trade Growth Rate 
 trade balance% trade cost% trade growth 












High school dropouts  -0.370*** -0.241*** -0.414*** -0.248*** -0.360*** -0.229*** 
  (0.011) (0.0112) (0.0228) (0.0226) (0.0105) (0.0106) 
High school graduates  -0.168*** -0.0821*** -0.234*** -0.116*** -0.170*** -0.0794*** 
  (0.00678) (0.00671) (0.0138) (0.0133) (0.0068) (0.00666) 
College graduates  0.344*** 0.157*** 0.451*** 0.278*** 0.358*** 0.178*** 
  (0.00925) (0.00934) (0.0185) (0.0174) (0.00936) (0.00931) 
Graduate degree  0.568*** 0.304*** 0.707*** 0.470*** 0.611*** 0.351*** 
  (0.0137) (0.0142) (0.0269) (0.0255) (0.0143) (0.0145) 
High school dropouts*(year=2010)  0.012 0.0386** -0.0179 -0.00403 0.0507** 0.0688*** 
  (0.0133) (0.0138) (0.0287) (0.0287) (0.0186) (0.019) 
High school graduates*(year=2010)  -0.00793 0.0105 -0.00348 0.00413 -0.00581 0.00766 
  (0.00863) (0.00855) (0.0178) (0.0172) (0.0129) (0.0126) 
College graduates*(year=2010)  0.0637*** 0.0390*** 0.0646** 0.0223 0.0505** 0.0422** 
  (0.0115) (0.0117) (0.0232) (0.0221) (0.016) (0.0156) 
Graduate degree*(year=2010)  0.154*** 0.0880*** 0.0752* 0.0076 0.0862*** 0.0485* 
 (0.0165) (0.0173) (0.0324) (0.0311) (0.0217) (0.0217) 
Year=2010  -0.110*** 0.247*** -0.103*** 0.256*** -0.0922*** 0.251*** 
  (0.00682) (0.0166) (0.014) (0.0204) (0.0114) (0.0186) 
(Trade balance)*100/GDP  0.166 0.413***     
  (0.123) (0.117)     
((Trade 
balance)*100/GDP)*year2010 
-0.16 -0.334***     
  (0.103) (0.0978)     
Trade balance share*highschool 
dropouts 
0.438** 0.197     
  (0.164) (0.159)     
Trade balance share*high school 
graduates  
0.489*** 0.280**     
  (0.0943) (0.0887)     
Trade balance share*college 
graduates 
-0.543*** -0.637***     
  (0.103) (0.0963)     
Trade balance share*graduate 
degree  
-0.603*** -0.748***     
  (0.135) (0.129)     
Trade balance share*highschool 
dropouts 
-0.19 -0.075     
    *year2010 (0.168) (0.164)     
Trade balance share*high school 
graduates  
-0.352*** -0.203*     
    *year2010 (0.0967) (0.0911)     
Trade balance share*college 
graduates 
0.442*** 0.531***     
    *year2010 (0.106) (0.0984)     
Trade balance share*graduate 
degree  
0.566*** 0.657***     
    *year2010 (0.137) (0.131)     
Trade cost share    -1.695*** -0.944***   
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Table 4.5: Regression Results: Trade Balance Share,  
Trade Costs Share and Trade Growth Rate (continued) 
    (0.23) (0.226)   
Tradecost*(year=2010)    -0.760*** -0.519**   
    (0.188) (0.184)   
High school dropouts*trade cost    0.31 -0.0108   
    (0.22) (0.215)   
High school graduates*trade cost    0.525*** 0.262*   
    (0.139) (0.133)   
College degree*trade cost    -0.947*** -1.076***   
    (0.21) (0.193)   
Graduate degree*trade cost    -1.312*** -1.573***   
    (0.34) (0.31)   
High school dropouts*trade 
cost*(year=2010)  
  0.538 0.635*   
    (0.327) (0.322)   
High school graduates*trade 
cost*(year=2010)  
  0.234 0.266   
    (0.212) (0.203)   
College degree*trade 
cost*(year=2010)  
  -0.668* -0.483   
    (0.307) (0.284)   
Graduate degree*trade 
cost*(year=2010)  
  0.33 0.282   
    (0.476) (0.439)   
Export growth rate      0.0519*** 0.0418** 
      (0.0139) (0.0129) 
Export growth rate*year2010     -0.00726 0.0234 
      (0.0286) (0.0276) 
Import growth rate      0.0305 -0.00198 
      (0.0258) (0.0256) 
Import growth rate*year2010     -0.0827 -0.0111 
      (0.0541) (0.0529) 
High school dropouts*export 
growth  
    -0.0726*** -0.0627*** 
      (0.0172) (0.0164) 
High school graduates*export 
growth 
    -0.0544*** -0.0470*** 
      (0.0153) (0.0141) 
College degree*export growth     0.0514* 0.039 
      (0.0222) (0.02) 
Graduate degree*export growth     -0.0462 -0.0267 
      (0.0383) (0.0337) 
High school dropouts*export 
growth  
    -0.109* -0.0969* 
    *(year=2010)     (0.0452) (0.0448) 
High school graduates*export 
growth  
    0.0256 0.0128 
    *(year=2010)     (0.0309) (0.0295) 
College degree*export 
growth*(year=2010)  
    0.00674 -0.0269 
      (0.0388) (0.0362) 
Graduate degree*export 
growth*(year=2010)  
    0.0882 0.00301 
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Table 4.5: Regression Results: Trade Balance Share,  
Trade Costs Share and Trade Growth Rate (continued) 
      (0.0541) (0.0503) 
High school dropouts*import 
growth  
    -0.0609 -0.0316 
      (0.0527) (0.0524) 
High school graduates*import 
growth 
    0.0000574 0.0142 
      (0.0304) (0.0298) 
College degree*import growth     0.0576 0.0364 
      (0.0413) (0.0378) 
Graduate degree*import growth     0.0837 0.0139 
      (0.0722) (0.0641) 
High school dropouts*import 
growth  
    -0.199* -0.14 
    *(year=2010)     (0.092) (0.0915) 
High school graduates*import 
growth  
    -0.0457 -0.00924 
    *(year=2010)     (0.0573) (0.0555) 
College degree*import 
growth*(year=2010)  
    0.0028 -0.119 
      (0.0702) (0.0656) 
Graduate degree*import 
growth*(year=2010)  
    0.118 0.0719 
      (0.102) (0.0944) 
Constant  7.962*** 7.498*** 8.083*** 7.506*** 7.938*** 7.452*** 
  (0.0686) (0.0802) (0.0711) (0.0819) (0.0689) (0.0815) 
R-squared  0.351 0.423 0.351 0.423 0.351 0.423 
Standard errors are in parentheses. 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001  
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Table 4.6: Regression Results: Full-impacts (1) 
 lnEX  lnIM lnIM lnEX lnTradeBalance lnTradeCost 
High school dropouts  0.12 0.0143 -0.0598 -0.646***  -0.00987 
  (0.103) (0.0921) (0.0709) (0.189) (0.0847) 
High school graduates  0.0879 0.0611 -0.00459 -0.205 0.0254 
  (0.0662) (0.0626) (0.0452) (0.133) (0.0604) 
College graduates  -0.184*  -0.213**  0.0703 0.344 -0.154* 
  (0.0782) (0.0753) (0.0581) (0.177) (0.0747) 
Graduate degree  -0.131 -0.114 0.0971 0.625**  -0.0291 
  (0.124) (0.117) (0.1) (0.214) (0.122) 
High school dropouts*(year=2010)  0.361**  0.192 0.221*  0.650***  0.12 
  (0.133) (0.113) (0.0972) (0.195) (0.102) 
High school graduates*(year=2010)  0.0758 -0.00126 0.114 0.25 -0.0129 
  (0.087) (0.0784) (0.0662) (0.139) (0.0743) 
College graduates*(year=2010)  0.136 0.169 0.00431 -0.0717 0.187* 
  (0.103) (0.0933) (0.0852) (0.185) (0.0905) 
Graduate degree*(year=2010)  0.0948 0.152 -0.0157 -0.133 0.121 
  (0.159) (0.141) (0.138) (0.233) (0.143) 
ln(export) 0.0728***    -0.130***     
  (0.00641)   (0.0107)    
ln(import)  -0.0756***  -0.0272**       
  (0.00784) (0.00931)      
ln(export)*year2010 0.0443   0.0291    
  (20.56)   (.)     
ln(import)*year2010 0.0709 0.0913      
  (28.39) (54.01)      
High school dropouts*import  -0.0147*  -0.0182**       
  (0.0066) (0.00633)      
High school graduates*import  -0.00843 -0.0105*       
  (0.00464) (0.00426)      
College degree*import  0.0303***  0.0275***       
  (0.00588) (0.00504)      
Graduate degree*import  0.0285**  0.0308***       
  (0.00944) (0.00771)      
High school dropouts  -0.00933 -0.00968      
   *Import*(year=2010) (0.00791) (0.00759)      
High school graduates  0.003 0.00153      
   *import*(year=2010) (0.00568) (0.00519)      
College degree*import*(year=2010)  -0.0143*  -0.0113      
  (0.00709) (0.00609)      
Graduate 
degree*import*(year=2010)  
-0.00918 -0.00792      
  (0.011) (0.00904)      
High school dropouts*export  -0.0122*    -0.0145**     
  (0.00573)   (0.0055)    
High school graduates*export  -0.00432   -0.00647    
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Table 4.6: Regression Results: Full-impacts (1) (continued) 
  (0.0037)   (0.0034)    
College degree*export  -0.00528   0.00894*     
  (0.00495)   (0.00424)    
Graduate degree*export  0.00356   0.0177*     
  (0.00873)   (0.00708)    
High school dropouts  -0.011   -0.0115    
   *export*(year=2010) (0.00746)   (0.00716)    
High school graduates  -0.00656   -0.00634    
   *export*(year=2010) (0.00518)   (0.00472)    
College degree*export*(year=2010)  0.00569   0.000122    
  (0.0069)   (0.00594)    
Graduate degree*export*(year=2010)  0.00499   0.00352    
  (0.0114)   (0.0094)    
ln((EX-IM)*CPI99)        0.0595***   
        (0.0111)  
ln(trade banlance)*year2010       -0.0915***   
        (0.0149)  
ln(trade balance)*high school 
dropouts 
      0.028  
        (0.0147)  
ln(trade balance)*high school 
graduates 
      0.00765  
        (0.0102)  
ln(trade balance)*college graduates       -0.0115  
        (0.0135)  
ln(trade balance)*graduate degree        -0.0216  
        (0.0163)  
ln(trade balance)*high school 
dropouts 
      -0.0433**   
    *year2010       (0.0152)  
ln(trade balance)*high school 
graduates 
      -0.0177  
    *year2010       (0.0106)  
ln(trade balance)*college graduates       0.00535  
    *year2010       (0.0141)  
ln(trade balance)*graduate degree        0.0115  
    *year2010       (0.0176)  
lnCOST          -0.0663*** 
          (0.015) 
lnCOST*year2010         0.0662 
          (.) 
lnCOST*high school dropouts         -0.0199** 
          (0.007) 
lnCOST*high school graduates         -0.00964 
          (0.00495) 
lnCOST*college graduates         0.0285*** 
          (0.00607) 
lnCOST*graduate degree         0.0305** 
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Table 4.6: Regression Results: Full-impacts (1) (continued) 
          (0.00974) 
lnCOST*high school 
dropouts*year2010 
        -0.00645 
          (0.0083) 
lnCOST*high school 
graduates*year2010 
        0.00245 
          (0.00597) 
lnCOST*college graduates*year2010         -0.0147* 
          (0.00721) 
lnCOST*graduate degree*year2010         -0.00652 
          (0.0112) 
Constant 8.37 8.536 11 8.671***  9.606 
 (701.9) (894.3) (36.85) (0.154) (.) 
R-squared  0.426 0.426 0.425 0.432 0.425 
Standard errors are in parentheses. 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
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Table 4.7: Regression Results: Full-impacts (2) 
 emport% 
import% 
import% export% trade 
balance% 
trade cost% trade growth 
High school dropouts  -0.226*** -0.232*** -0.231*** -0.236*** -0.237*** -0.226*** 
  (0.0125) (0.0118) (0.0119) (0.0113) (0.0228) (0.0107) 
High school graduates  -0.0737*** -0.0764*** -0.0795*** -0.0798*** -0.112*** -0.0781*** 
  (0.0078) (0.00714) (0.00761) (0.00672) (0.0133) (0.00667) 
College graduates  0.156*** 0.153*** 0.165*** 0.158*** 0.277*** 0.178*** 
  (0.0111) (0.00991) (0.0111) (0.00935) (0.0175) (0.00932) 
Graduate degree  0.284*** 0.288*** 0.287*** 0.298*** 0.464*** 0.348*** 
  (0.0183) (0.0153) (0.0183) (0.0143) (0.0256) (0.0146) 
High school 
dropouts*(year=2010)  
0.0541*** 0.0344* 0.0524*** 0.0308* -0.0197 0.0656*** 
  (0.0164) (0.0147) (0.0158) (0.014) (0.0291) (0.0193) 
High school 
graduates*(year=2010)  
0.0229* 0.00927 0.0253* 0.00814 -0.000634 0.00866 
  (0.0107) (0.00912) (0.0105) (0.00858) (0.0174) (0.0127) 
College 
graduates*(year=2010)  
0.0262 0.0353** 0.0219 0.0347** 0.0199 0.0396* 
  (0.0148) (0.0124) (0.0148) (0.0117) (0.0222) (0.0156) 
Graduate 
degree*(year=2010)  
0.0810*** 0.0937*** 0.0814*** 0.0886*** 0.0101 0.0459* 
  (0.024) (0.0186) (0.024) (0.0174) (0.0315) (0.0218) 
Year=2010  0.324 0.324 0.324 0.322 0.337 0.271 
  (57.59) (.) (.) (82.68) (73.57) (.) 
High school dropouts*  -1.069  -1.326*    
   export share of GDP (0.753)  (0.645)    
High school graduates*  -0.356  -0.796*    
   export share of GDP (0.417)  (0.345)    
College degree*export 
share of GDP  
-0.42  1.412***    
  (0.531)  (0.388)    
Graduate degree*  0.302  2.472***    
   export share of GDP (0.796)  (0.569)    
High school dropouts* 
export share  
0.248  0.424    
   of GDP*(year=2010) (0.782)  (0.676)    
High school 
graduates*export share  
-0.15  0.212    
   of GDP*(year=2010)  (0.44)  (0.368)    
College degree*export 
share  
0.546  -0.988*    
   of GDP*(year=2010) (0.557)  (0.417)    
Graduates degree*export 
share  
0.0174  -1.886**    
   of GDP*(year=2010) (0.828)  (0.606)    
High school dropouts*  -0.186 -0.290*     
   import share of GDP (0.168) (0.145)     
High school graduates*  -0.247** -0.290***     
   import share of GDP (0.0957) (0.0792)     
College degree*import 
share of GDP  
0.593*** 0.536***     
  (0.114) (0.0835)     
Graduate degree*  0.638*** 0.683***     
   import share of GDP (0.157) (0.113)     
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Table 4.7: Regression Results: Full-impacts (2) (continued) 
High school 
dropouts*import share  
0.0771 0.143     
   of GDP*(year=2010) (0.173) (0.149)     
High school 
graduates*import share  
0.189 0.203*     
   of GDP*(year=2010)  (0.0981) (0.0815)     
College degree*import 
share  
-0.496*** -0.434***     
   of GDP*(year=2010)  (0.116) (0.0857)     
Graduates degree*import 
share  
-0.561*** -0.595***     
   of GDP*(year=2010) (0.159) (0.115)     
Trade balance share*    0.248   
   high school dropouts    (0.16)   
Trade balance share*     0.290**   
   high school graduates    (0.0887)   
Trade balance share*    -0.617***   
   college graduates    (0.0963)   
Trade balance share     -0.768***   
 *graduate degree    (0.129)   
Trade balance 
share*highs school  
   -0.135   
   dropouts *year2010    (0.164)   
Trade balance share*high 
school  
   -0.215*   
   graduates*year2010    (0.091)   
Trade balance 
share*college  
   0.511***   
   graduates*year2010    (0.0984)   
Trade balance 
share*graduate  
   0.678***   
   degree*year2010    (0.131)   
High school 
dropouts*trade cost  
    -0.0745  
      (0.217)  
High school 
graduates*trade cost  
    0.24  
      (0.133)  
College degree*trade cost      -1.067***  
      (0.193)  
Graduate degree*trade 
cost  
    -1.583***  
      (0.312)  
High school 
dropouts*trade cost  
    0.741*  
   *(year=2010)     (0.325)  
High school 
graduates*trade 43ost  
    0.287  
   *(year=2010)     (0.205)  
College degree*trade cost      -0.478  
   *(year=2010)     (0.285)  
Graduate degree*trade 
cost  
    0.28  
   *(year=2010)     (0.444)  
High school 
dropouts*export growth  
     -0.0594*** 
       (0.0166) 
High school 
graduates*export growth 
     -0.0435** 
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Table 4.7: Regression Results: Full-impacts (2) (continued) 
       (0.0141) 
College degree*export 
growth 
     0.0391* 
       (0.0199) 
Graduate degree*export 
growth 
     -0.034 
       (0.0335) 
High school 
dropouts*export growth  
     -0.0978* 
   *(year=2010)      (0.0451) 
High school 
graduates*export growth  
     0.00746 
   *(year=2010)      (0.0296) 
College degree*export 
growth  
     -0.0299 
   *(year=2010)      (0.0362) 
Graduate degree*export 
growth  
     0.0118 
   *(year=2010)      (0.0503) 
High school 
dropouts*import growth  
     -0.0325 
       (0.0522) 
High school graduates      0.0106 
   *import growth      (0.0296) 
College degree*import 
growth 
     0.038 
       (0.0376) 
Graduate degree*import 
growth 
     0.0338 
       (0.0638) 
High school 
dropouts*import growth  
     -0.158 
   *(year=2010)      (0.0916) 
High school graduates*       -0.0188 
  import 
growth*(year=2010) 
     (0.0555) 
College degree*import 
growth  
     -0.123 
    *(year=2010)      (0.0655) 
Graduate degree*import 
growth  
     0.0534 
    *(year=2010)      (0.0943) 
Constant  9.204 9.217 9.193 9.221 9.186 9.53 
  (34.92) (.) (.) (84.04) (73.89) (.) 
R-squared  0.426 0.425 0.425 0.425 0.425 0.425 
Standard errors are in parentheses. 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
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Table 4.8 Results Summary 
 












0.0197 0.0235 (0.0128) (0.0121) (0.0221) (0.0213) 0.6440 0.1550 (0.6470) (0.1590) (0.6820) (0.9350) 0.6930 0.1560 (0.0052) 0.0310 0.0122 (0.0081) 
College 
Graduates 
0.0360 0.0454 0.0257 0.0134 0.0162 0.0001 2.7930 1.1850 0.1960 0.0300 (2.0200) (3.0220) (0.2240) (0.0270) 0.0808 0.0773 0.0344 (0.0957) 
Graduate 
Degrees 
0.0472 0.0567 0.0279 0.0201 0.0170 0.0105 3.8760 1.3100 0.3180 0.0160 (2.5170) (2.7540) (0.3350) (0.0120) 0.0151 0.0415 0.0119 0.0727 
Skill 
Premium 
widen widen narrow widen widen widen narrow widen widen 
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Figure 2.1: Wage Premium  
 
Relative Wage of Nonproduction/Production Workers, U.S. Manufacturing. 
Source: NBER productivity database, (Bartelsman and Gray, 1996), Advanced 
International Trade, Robert C. Feenstra. 
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Figure 3.1: Regression Results 
 
  Note: *Tariff rate, most favored nation, simple mean, all products (%) 








*China Average Tariff Rate 
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